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Abstract
This paper studies the existence and the scale of education externalities in the un-
employment durations suered by workers in the UK. First, we develop a theoretical
model. Using a matching framework we show that a rise in the average level of educa-
tion of a labour market will aect unemployment durations in two dierent ways. It
will increase the firms’ expected profits per vacancy opened, since firms expect to be
matched with a more qualified worker, rising job creation and reducing unemployment
durations. We call this the Composition or External eect. But, since more qualified
workers are more e!cient in the process of job search, it will also rise the competi-
tion amongst workers for opened vacancies, increasing unemployment durations. We
name this the Competition eect. In the most skilled segments of the labour market
the composition eect will dominate the competition eect, while in the least skilled
segments the opposite will be true. Then, we test these theoretical results empiri-
cally using data from the UK Labour Force Survey for the 17 UK regions over the
period 1992Q1-99Q4. We find that a 1% rise in the average level of education reduces
unemployment durations of individuals from skilled occupations by 2.9% on average,
while it rises the unemployment durations of individuals from unskilled occupations by
1.9% on average. This eect is robust to dierent measures of education, to controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity and to dierent parameterisations of the hazard function.
1 Introduction
Education externalities have been at the heart of the economic and policy debate for the
last two decades. Dierent theoretical explanations have been developed, and these can be
grouped into two main categories: technological externalities (or non-pecuniary) and pe-
cuniary externalities. Both these types of externalities were already mentioned by Alfred
Marshall (Marshall (1920)) as reasons explaining the concentration of economic activity.
However, they were not further developed until more recently.
The first type of externality was re-discovered by the works of Romer (1986) and Lucas
(1988). They showed theoretically that, in an area with a higher average level of education
processes like the exchange of ideas, imitation or learning by doing are more likely to occur,
in turn fostering technological progress. These type of spill-overs have been explored in great
detail by the endogenous growth literature. The second type of externality was re-discovered
by the works of Krugman (1991a) and further developed by the new economic geography
literature. However, these ideas have also been used in other areas of economic research.
Acemoglu (1996) showed that, in a labour market were it is costly for firms and workers to
find each other, if the average level of education of workers is high then firms will invest more
in physical capital. This generates a pecuniary education externality which does not work
through technology, but through improving the search process. A similar type of externality
is developed in this paper. Other authors have used these ideas to stress instead the interac-
tions between education attainment and the location of economic activity. Rotemberg and
Saloner (2000) study an externality coming from the interaction between regional agglomer-
ation of production and the incentive for workers to invest in industry-specific skills. Amiti
and Pissarides (2002) show that the existence of a bigger pool of qualified workers improves
the quality of matches and helps agglomeration of activity.
The existence of education externalities means that economically identical workers will tend
to earn higher wages and enjoy greater employment rates in human capital rich areas than in
human capital poor areas. That is, the social return to education may exceed the private re-
turn and, therefore, individuals will tend invest in education below what is socially optimal.
This has provided one of the main justifications for the public provision of formal education.
Primary and secondary education, as well as an important part of university education, is
almost completely subsidized by the state in most countries around the world. Therefore,
the magnitude of the social return to education is crucial for assessing the e!ciency of public
investment in education. In addition, many regional policies of development are justified on
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the existence of agglomeration externalities often related to education externalities.
However, despite the significant policy implications and the theoretical developments, there
had not been any relevant empirical work on this area until fairly recently. Moreover, most
of the existing work has concentrated on the estimation of the eect of average education in
an area on individual wages, that is, on estimating the social returns to education. Rauch
(1993) was the first attempt to estimate human capital externalities. He used data from the
United States’ 1980 Census to test the eect of average education in the Standard Metropol-
itan Statistical Areas on individual wages. He found that a one-year increase in average
schooling in an area raises individual wages by between 3-5%. Moretti (1999) re-estimates
this eect for US cities using instruments for the average level of education to avoid an
omitted variable bias problem. He finds that a 1 percentage point increase in college share
in a city raises average wages by 1.2%-1.4% above the private returns to education. Other
studies have found little evidence of significant external returns. Acemoglu and Angrist
(2000) estimated the eect of average schooling in US states on individual wages, using the
change in State compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws as instruments. They
found modest and statistically insignificant external returns. Ciccone and Peri (2000) used
a standard neoclassical growth model to identify external eects and found that these were
negligible and insignificant. Instead, they found substantial scale eects.
Another line of empirical research has looked at the eect of education externalities on em-
ployment growth in cities. Simon (1998) found that a rise in the supply of high school and
degree graduates in a US Standard Metropolitan Area in 1940 increases employment growth
in the area and that this eect is persistent, lasting up to 40 years. Simon and Nardelli
(1996) looking at English cities found that this eect could last up to a century. Glaeser
et al (1992) studied the eect of knowledge spill-overs on employment growth in industries
within cities. They found that these eects are more likely to occur between industries
within a city and when competition between firms in an industry is strong.
In this paper we take a dierent approach - we test the existence of education externalities
in the matching process. Firstly, a model showing the existence of a pecuniary education
externality in the matching process is developed. In this model, human capital externalities
arise when there are matching frictions in the labour market because firms have to decide
whether to create a job or not before knowing who they will finally employ. Thus, a more
educated labour force will increase the expected profits per vacancy opened and increase job
creation in that area, at the same time increasing the worker’s probability of finding a job.
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We call this external eect. But, a more educated labor force will also be more e!cient
searching for jobs. This will increase the competition amongst workers for opened vacancies
and reduce the average probability of finding a job. The net eect on the probability of find-
ing a job will depend on the relative importance of these two forces. Then, we hypothesize
that for the more skilled segments of the labour market, where the worker’s qualifications
are a fundamental determinant of the firm’s expected profits, the external eect dominates
the composition eect. Meanwhile, in the unskilled segments of the labour market, firms
benefit only from workers achieving a certain minimum level of education. Therefore, job
creation reacts less to a more qualified workforce and the competition eect dominates the
external eect. This means that if externalities exist in the matching process, one should
find that unemployed individuals belonging to the skilled (unskilled) segments of a labour
market where the labour force is better educated have a higher (lower) probability of mov-
ing from unemployment into employment than otherwise similar unemployed individuals in
labour markets where the labour force is less educated. In addition, for a given average, the
more equal (unequal) the distribution of education the higher the probability of transition.
We test this theory by a maximum-likelihood estimation of a model of the duration of un-
employment which assumes a discrete-time semi-parametric hazard function and allows the
covariates to vary within each unemployment spell. The estimation shows that the average
level of education aects positively the probability of transition from unemployment to em-
ployment for individuals from skilled occupations, while the variance of education aects it
negatively. The opposite is found for individuals from unskilled occupations. Both of these
eects are statistically significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of this eect is in line
with the findings in the literature. A 1% increase in the average education of the labour
market rises (reduces) on average the probability of employment of individuals from skilled
(unskilled) occupations by 2.9% (-1.9%).
Finally, an important issue in this literature is whether these eects are due to education
externalities or to complementarities in skills. Moretti (1999) indicated that the fact that
average education aects wages does not necessarily imply the existence of education ex-
ternalities. This result could be due to complementarities between high and low educated
workers. However, he argued that if dierent skills are perfect substitutes, the eect of an
increase in the supply of educated workers on their own wage had to be an external eect.
By doing this he found that a 1 percentage point increase in the labour force share of col-
lege graduates increases wages of college graduates by 1.2%, and therefore concluded that
education externalities are important in US cities. Ciccone and Peri (2000) argued instead
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that if skills are imperfect substitutes, one cannot separately identify the external eect
from the eect of the complementarity of skills using a regression of individual wages on
average wages. They used a standard neoclassical growth model to identify external eects
and found that these were negligible and insignificant. But, their methodology is completely
dependent on the theoretical model used. It is di!cult to apply directly their work to the
model of this paper since they implicitly assume a competitive labour market with no un-
employment. However, what their work shows is that there is a significant eect of an area’s
skill composition on wages paid, but this is not due to an externality that works through
improvements in productivity. Then, using their model they conclude that their result has
to be due to complementarity of skills. Alternatively, one could interpret this result as sug-
gesting that it might be other types of externalities not working through productivity which
are important. One such type could be the one studied in this research, which aects wages
through improvements in the matching process.
This paper will be organised as follows. In section 2 the theoretical model is developed.
The dataset used as well as some descriptive analysis of the distribution of education and
its relation with labour market performance is described in section 3. The econometric
methodology is explained in section 4. Section 5 outlines the estimation results and some
robustness analysis. In section 6 we try to confirm the relevance of the results by estimating
directly the eect of education externalities on job creation. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
Workers1
In the economy there are L individuals, each one born with a dierent ability (ai). When
young they attend full-time education and then enter the labor market with the human
capital obtained. Individual human capital hi is a f unction of innate ability and assu med to
be given, hi = h(ai). In the labor market individuals and firms engage in a search process,
which produces a number of matches. Individuals search with dierent intensity si depending
on their characteristics, mainly the level of education. This can be expressed as:2
si = s(hi) = h
B
i (1)
1This theoretical model is based on Acemoglu (1996) and Burriel-Llombart (2002).
2The individual’s decisions of education and search e!ciency are assumed exogenous to simplify the
model, but can be easily endogenized. See Burriel-Llombart (2002).
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The more intensively an individual searches (the more units of search he supplies), the
higher his probability of finding a job. However, in equilibrium, the individual probability
of employment also depends on how intensively the other individuals in that labour market
search, that is, on the aggregate supply of units of search S.
S =
]
sif(i)di =
]
hBif(i)di = LE(h
B
i ) (2)
Those individuals who find a job, produce and earn a wage, while the rest remain unem-
ployed and earn a subsidy.
Notice that we can define
U
h(i)Bf(i)di
L
as E[hB], which from now on will be called "average"
education. However, this term depends on the whole distribution.
Firms
The number of firms active in the economy is variable. When a firm decides to enter the labor
market opens a vacancy and starts looking for a worker. The cost of opening the vacancy
is sunk, so the firm will only open one when expected profits are non-negative. Once a firm
and a worker meet, the firm buys the appropriate technology for the worker’s human capital
level and the worker brings one unit of labor and his human capital. The result of the match
is the production of yi units of product using the following technology:
yi =
+
Ahki if hi < h
Ah
k
otherwise
(3)
where A > 0 is a constant representing the technological level and 1 > k > B > 03.4 Accord-
ing to this technology the worker’s human capital contributes to production up to a certain
level, h. Any human capital above this level does not improve the worker’s productivity and
therefore does not benefit the firm. This upper-bound will be higher the more skilled the
occupation or segment of the labour market in which the firm operates. This assumption
precludes the counterfactual result that a more qualified worker will always be more pro-
ductive independently of the type of job for which he is employed. That is, for example the
productivity of an operator will improve significantly after obtaining the compulsory level
of education or a vocational qualification but it will not increase any further after obtaining
3This is found to be always true when the individual decisions are endogeneized. It only requires the cost
of search to be concave.
4Physical capital is not introduced in this version of the model to simplify and emphasize the main
mechanism studied.
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a degree.
When a match is realized, the occupied job will yield a return that is at least as high as
the sum of the expected returns of a searching firm and a searching worker. Wages are set
to share this economic rent according to the Nash Solution to a bargaining problem, as in
Pissarides (2000). This means that the worker receives a share q of output, while the firm
receives the rest of the output.5
wi = qyi
Zi = (1 q)yi (4)
Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market is composed of L workers supplying S units of search and V vacancies who
engage in a search process by which N matches are created. Since each worker searches for a
job with dierent search intensity, si, - i.e. each worker supplies a dierent number of units
of search - the number of matches depends on the aggregate supply of search, S, instead of
the number of people searching L, and on the number of vacancies:
N = m(V, S)
where m(., .) represents a matching function with standard properties.6 The level of em-
ployment (N) should also be equal to the number of units of search supplied by individuals
looking for work times the probability that a worker meets a firm (q), N = qS. This implies
that on average,
q =
N
S
= m(
V
S
, 1) = m(w, 1). (5)
where w = V
S
is the labour market tightness. It is assumed that q is also the average
transition probability. Since in this model each worker searches with dierent intensity
for jobs, each worker will face a dierent probability of employment. In particular, the
individual probability of employment will be equal to the number of search units supplied
by that individual times the average probability of employment.
qi = siq (6)
The average probability of filling a vacancy (p) has to be equal to the level of employment,
5The parameter  might be interpreted as the worker’s relative bargaining power.
6Increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one.
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N , over the number of vacancies opened, V .
p =
N
V
= m(1,
w
1
) =
q
w (7)
The expected profit of a firm from a vacancy (E(Z)) will be equal to the probability of
filling a vacancy (p) with a worker, times the profit obtained from employing that worker.
Since the firm does not know which worker will arrive we have to integrate over all possible
individuals.
E(Z) = p
U
[y(i) w(i)] f(i)di
S
There is a fixed cost of opening a job equal to k, which is independent of the type of worker
recruited. In equilibrium no firm can open a job and make a positive profit since there are
no barriers to entry, therefore E(Z) = k. Substituting the equations determining p, yi, wi
and S ((equations (7), (4) and (2)) into this equation, and solving for w we obtain the labor
market tightness as a function of the employment rate and the distribution of education:
w = q

(1 q)A
k
%U i
0
h(i)kf(i)di+ h
k U"
i
f(i)diU
h(i)Bf(i)di
&
(9)
where i represents the marginal individual with education equal to h. According to this
expression market tightness depends positively on the employment rate, as well as on the
worker’s average product per unit of search. This is in turn a function of the distribution of
education in that labour market segment. Thus, a rise in the average product per unit of
search increases vacancy creation and labour market tightness.
For simplicity, we define L =
U i
0
f(i)di the labour force with education below h, L =U"
i
f(i)di the labour force with education above h and E(hk) =
U
i
0h
kf(i)di is the ”av-
erage” level of education for the labour force with education below h. Then, we can re-write
the worker’s average product per unit of search as follows:
U i
0
h(i)kf(i)di+ h
k U"
i
f(i)diU
h(i)Bf(i)di
=
L E(hk) + L h
k
LE(hBi )
(10)
Finally, assuming the matching function in the equation determining the average probability
of employment (equation (5)) takes a Cobb-Douglas form, m (V, S) = (bV ) (S)13, and
substituting theta into this equation using equation (9) we obtain the average probability
of employment that equilibrates the labour market. This equilibrium is also shown in figure
1a), where market tightness (equation (9)) is represented by the straight line named q/w and
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Figure 1: a) Labour market equilibrium. b) Rise in E[hk].
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the average probability of employment (equation (5)) is represented by the curve named q:7
q =

b(1 q)A
k
 
13
%
L E(hk) + L h
k
LE(hBi )
& 
13
Then, substituting this expression into equation (6) we obtain the individual probability of
employment in equilibrium:
qi = h
B
i

b(1 q)A
k
 
13
%
L E(hk) + L h
k
LE(hBi )
& 
13
(11)
This expression is the basis for the empirical estimation of the model developed. It shows
that, as one would expect, the individual probability of finding a job depends positively on
his level of education, the average product per unit of search, the firm’s share of output, the
technology and the e!ciency of search, while it depends negatively on the cost of opening
vacancies. However, a rise in the average level of education has an ambiguous eect on this
probability, since it aects both the denominator and numerator of this expression. We will
7An alternative equilibrium with full employment (and high market tightness) may prevail when the
”average” level of human capital is very high, or the cost of opening a vacancy is very low. This equilibrium
will exist when the two equations in figure 1a) cross above the upper bound of full employment. The reason
is that, when the ”average” human capital in the economy is very large, the firms’ expected profits are so
big that they will keep on creating new jobs beyond the point in which market tightness is large enough to
achieve full employment. This will happen until expected profits disappear and labour market equilibrium
is achieved. We will not discuss this alternative equilibrium since the focus of the paper is on the eects of
education externalities on the employment rate.
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study this issue in the next section.
2.1 Education Externalities: Composition vs. Competition ef-
fects:
A rise in the average level of education generates two osetting eects on the average product
per unit of search and thus in the equilibrium values of the average probability of employ-
ment and market tightness (see equations (11) and (9)):
Composition eect: A rise in the average level of education rises the expected produc-
tivity of workers, L E(hk) + L h
k
, increasing the profit per vacancy opened and therefore
rising vacancy creation and the probability of employment. This is what we mean in this
paper by the external eect of education.
Competition eect: But a rise in the average level of education also rises the aggre-
gate supply of search units (E[hB]), increasing the competition amongst workers for existing
vacancies (the market is more crowded for workers), reducing market tightness and the av-
erage probability of employment per unit of search. This is the congestion eect typical of
all matching models.
Depending on which of these two eects dominates we may find three dierent scenarios:
a) Positive external eect: When all workers have a level of education below h, the
composition eect dominates the competition eect. The external eect becomes E(h
k
i )
E(hBi )
and,
since k > B, a rise in the average level of education always has a positive eect on the
equilibrium employment rate. This is represented in figure 1b).
b) Negative external eect: When all workers have a level of education above h, the
composition eect disappears and the competition eect is the only one present. Then, a
rise in the average level of education will only increase competition amongst workers for the
existing vacancies and reduce the average employment rate and market tightness. This is
represented by a external eect equal to
k
h
k
E(hBi )
l
c) Indeterminate sign of external eect: Finally, when some workers have education
above h and some below, it is unclear which eect dominates and what will be the sign of
the external eect. In this case the external eect takes the form represented in equation (10).
Which of these scenarios prevails will depend on the labour market segment of analysis. The
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more skilled the labour market segment, the higher is the upper bound on productivity (h)
and therefore the more likely is a positive external eect. Therefore, one would expect to
find a positive external eect for skilled occupations a negative external eect for unskilled
occupations and an indeterminate eect for the semiskilled ones.
Human capital externalities arise in this model because firms have to decide whether to
create a job or not before knowing who they will finally employ and workers have to decided
how many units of search to supply before knowing who they will work for. A more edu-
cated labour force will increase the expected profits per vacancy opened and increase job
creation. But it will also rise the competition amongst workers for the opened vacancies,
which might partially or totally oset the first eect. However, if the labour market was
perfectly competitive and there were no matching frictions, firms would be matched with
workers until the worker’s human capital made the firm’s profits equal to zero. In this case,
every firm and worker knows who it will be matched with and therefore the job creation
decision depends only on the individual’s human capital. That is, in the competitive case
aggregate employment is determined by the position of the marginal worker in the education
distribution. With matching frictions it is determined by the whole distribution of educa-
tion. This external eect has been named a pecuniary externality since it is generated in the
matching process and is independent of the existence of increasing returns in the production
function.
Technological Education Externalities:
As was mentioned in the introduction, education externalities may also arise through the
exchange of ideas, imitation or learning by doing (Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988)). These
external eects have been called technological or non-pecuniary externalities because they
are generated in the process of production. They can be captured in this model by allowing
the aggregate productivity term A to depend on aggregate human capital in the following
way: A = E[h#i ]. If we substitute this into equation (11) we have:
qi = h
B
i

b(1 q)
k
 
13
E[h#i ]

13
%
L E(hk) + L h
k
LE(hBi )
& 
13
(12)
In general, this type of external eect will have a positive (or zero) eect on the employ-
ment rate, because it increases the productivity of all workers. That is, #  0. However, in a
model with skill-biased technological externalities, like Acemoglu (1998) a rise in the number
of skilled people incentivates the development of new technologies that increase the produc-
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tivity of skilled workers and reduce the productivity of unskilled workers. In this case, the
external eect will be positive for skilled workers (# > 0) and negative for unskilled workers
(# < 0), like in the model developed here. Therefore, as equation (12) shows, pecuniary and
non-pecuniary externalities skill-biased externalities cannot be separately identified empiri-
cally using this model. Instead, in the empirical estimation we will control for the the level
of technology in the segment of the labour market by including the industrial structure of
employment by occupation and region (using a 4-industry classification and 4 occupations).
Finally, we will use the specification of equation 12 to test whether the probability of finding
a job given that you are unemployed for t periods (or unemployment duration) is posi-
tively related with the average level of education in the labour market after controlling for
individual education and other individual and local characteristics.
3 The data
The data used in this paper comes from the longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LFS). The
LFS is designed to be representative of the total population in GB8, containing very detailed
information on the labour force status of individuals as well as on family and individual
characteristics. In addition, we use the non-longitudinal LFS to obtain aggregate variables
reflecting the evolution of the British regional labour market over time.
The longitudinal LFS is conducted every quarter on all members of around 60.000 house-
holds. One fifth of the sample is renewed quarterly and hence we can observe any individual
for a maximum of five quarters. It started in the first quarter of 1992 (march-may) and we
use all waves up to the fourth quarter of 1999 (November-January)9. This period of nine
years covers more than a whole cycle of the British Economy. The sample is constructed
using only the unemployment spells taking place during the five quarters each individual
is in the sample, to avoid a stock sampling bias problem. That is, spells which start not
earlier than the quarter of the first interview. This means that the longest spell will be
14 months. Spells will be measured in months. The resulting sample consists of 15,974
unemployment spells with an average duration of 3.4 months. Out of these durations 40.8%
finished with a transition into employment, 15.7% finished with a transition into inactivity
8Northern Ireland is excluded from the study since the quarterly LFS was not introduced in this area
until the winter of 1994-95.
9After 1999 regions are only reported using the new classification of regions (GOR). In addition, the
county indicator is also dropped from the LFS at this moment which makes it impossible to construct
comparable regions.
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and the remaining 43.5% did not conclude before the individual left the sample (see table 12).
Since the aim of this study is the estimation of the eect of education matching externalities
on the transitions from unemployment to employment, the most important variables are the
ones measuring the distribution of education in the local labour market. We assume that
the distribution of education is perfectly described by its mean and variance. The theo-
retical model predicts that what is important is the specific segment of the labour market
the individual is participating in. The problem is how to define the relevant segment of the
labour market in the data. In this paper we use occupation groups in each region. Using this
definition, we calculate the average level of education as the mean education across all the
individuals belonging to the same occupation group in a region at a moment in time. Every
individual is attributed the average level of education of his own labour market segment -
e.g. a manager is attributed the average level of education of the managers in his area in that
quarter. We are only looking at direct spill-over eects, that is, within occupation spill-over.
We do similarly for the variance of education.
The education and occupation variables used are explained in table 1.10 The individual
education variable has 9 levels going from low to high education. This classification distin-
guishes between academic and vocational qualifications. In addition, we have aggregated
this variable into 4 education groups, where academic and equivalent vocational qualifica-
tions belong to the same category. The Occupation variable follows the 9 Major Occupation
Groups defined by the new Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) introduced in 1991.
This classification was designed so that the occupational groupings brought together jobs
with similar requirements in terms of qualifications, training and experience. The ranking
of these nine major categories from 1-9 was meant to reflect the progression of the occupa-
tions from those requiring a higher level of qualifications, training and/or experience down
to those requiring a lower level of skill or experience. This is particularly relevant for this
study since we are using occupation groups to identify segments of the labour market which
are fairly homogeneous in terms of the education level (ability) of its workers. We have
also constructed two more aggregated occupation variables with 2 and 4 groups, keeping the
hierarchical structure of the SOC. The regions considered are based on the Standard Sta-
tistical Regions classification, split into metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas whenever
possible. This divides GB into 19 regions.11
10A more detailed definition of the education variable can be found in appendix A, table 10
11A detailed list of the regions and the counties included in each region can be found in Appendix B, table
11.
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Table 1: Categories of Education and Occupation variables
Education Occupation
9 groups 4 groups 9 groups 4 groups 2 groups
9 Degree Degree or equiv. Managers High Skilled
8 High Voc. (8 9) Professionals (8 9) Skilled
7 A Level A Level or equiv. Technicians High Semi-skilled (6 9)
6 Mid. Voc. (6 7) Craft (6 7)
5 O Level O Level or equiv. Clerical Low Semi-skilled
4 Low Voc. (4 5) Personnel (4 5)
3 Other Acad. Other Sales Low Skilled Unskilled
2 Other Voc. & no qual Operators (1 3) (1 5)
1 No qual (1 3) Others
The other explanatory variables used in this study can be divided into three groups: per-
sonal, household and regional characteristics. The personal characteristics include: age, sex,
education, last job’s occupational group, being white, being married, having migrated in the
last year, and whether receiving unemployment benefit or financial help from relatives. The
household variables are: region of residence, whether receiving housing benefit, number of
dependent children under 6 and between 6 and 16, number of people working in the house-
hold and whether it is a one-person-household or a two-person-household. The variables
reflecting regional characteristics are obtained from the non-longitudinal LFS and include:
average level and variance of education within each occupation group in the region, unem-
ployment rate by region, inactivity rate by region, vacancy rate by occupation and region,
ratio of the flow of immigrants to the flow of emigrants and industry’s share of employment
in the region (10 industries). The migration data is derived from the National Health Service
Central Register, provided by NOMIS. Finally, we also include time and region dummies.
All the regional variables are included in the estimation in logarithms. The household and
regional variables are allowed to vary within each unemployment spell, except for the region
of residence12, while the personal characteristics remain unchanged13.
12The LFS is a survey of non-movers.
13Changes in some of the personal characteristics, like age (in years) or education, may occur during an
unemployment spell. However, since the maximum spell is 14 months, the eects of these changes are likely
to be small.
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Figure 2: Survival by 4 o ccupations
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics: Education, Survival rates and Vacan-
cies.
The theoretical model predicts that regions with a relatively higher level of education will
have higher job creation and lower unemployment durations. We can use the Kaplan-Meier
empirical survival in unemployment to have an initial idea about the dierences in unem-
ployment durations across the UK local labour markets during the 1990s. The empirical
survival is the fraction of unemployment spells ongoing at the start of a month which do not
end during that month14. It represents the probability of remaining unemployed given that
you have been unemployed for x months.
In general, the most qualified occupations have the lowest probability of remaining in un-
employment for all durations (figure 2). An exception are the Service occupations which
have the lowest survival for durations longer than two months. If we now look across re-
gions, we observe that the empirical survival in unemployment is lower in the region with
the highest education level (Scotland) than in the one with the lowest level (Metropolitan
West Midlands) (figure 3).15 We can also look at dierent regions by occupation. In figure
4 we compare the empirical survival in unemployment state of the top and bottom regions
in terms of qualifications by four occupation groups. It shows that regions with a more
14The empirical survivor for month t is equal to the number of spells which do not end during month t,
divided by the size of the risk set at the beginning of month t. The size of the risk set at the beginning of
month t is the number of people whose spells have not ended or been censored at the beginning of month t.
15This is not true for all regions. For example, Greater London has one of the highest survival rates for
all durations of unemployment although it has one of the most qualified workforce, while Rest of Northern
region has a medium survival rate but one of the lowest levels of qualifications.
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Fi gu re 3 : Survi va l o f t o p & b ot t o m r eg i o ns
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Figure 4: Su rvival i n state of unempl oyment by o ccup ation f or top & b ottom regions
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Figure 5: Market tightness by occupation
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Figure 6: Average education vs labour market tightness by occupation (line with crosses
excludes 3 top & bottom regions)
av
er
ag
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
T&WRNorth SY WY
RY&H
EMid EAng
InLon
OutLon
RSE
SW
WMid
RWMid
Man
Mersey
RNW
Wales
Strath
Scot
av
er
ag
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
T&WRNorth
SY
WY
RY&H
EMid EAng
InLon
OutLon
RSE SW
WMid
RWMid
Man
Mersey
RNW
Wales
Strath
Scot
av
er
ag
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
T&WRNorth
SY
WYRY&H
EMid
EAng
InLon
OutLon
RSE
SW
WMid
RWMid
Man
Mersey
RNW
Wales
Strath
Scot
av
er
ag
e 
ed
uc
at
io
n
0 5 10 15 20
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7
T&W
RNorth
SY
WY
RY&H
EMid
EAng
InLon
OutLon
RSE
SW
WMid
RWMid
Man Mersey
RNW
Wales
Strath
Scot
22
 man/prof
year
market tightness (%) market tightness (%)
service occupationsmanual occupations
market tightness (%)
technical occupations 
market tightness (%)
man/profesional occupations
qualified workforce enjoy lower probabilities of remaining unemployed.16
Another important variable determining the performance of a labour market is labour market
tightness, measured as the ratio of opened vacancies to the number of unemployed. Contrary
to what was expected, figure 5 suggests that the most skilled occupations have the lowest
market tightness. However, this is not longer true when we look at the relation between
education and labour market tightness by occupational group and region. In figure 6, we see
that there is a positive correlation between these variables for the more skilled occupations,
but a negative one for the least skilled ones. This result is strongest when we drop the top
and bottom regions in terms of education 17.
In conclusion, all the descriptive evidence points towards a positive relationship between
regional education by occupation and labour market performance, confirming the conclusions
of the theoretical model. Of course, it could be possible that the regions with the most
qualified workforce have labour markets performing better simply because more qualified
people face lower unemployment rates and shorter unemployment durations and not because
of an external eect. That is why we now move to test this hypothesis using econometric
techniques which allow us to control for the individual and regional characteristics which
could be driving this result.
4 Econometric specification.
In order to study the determinants of the transitions from unemployment, we apply econo-
metric duration models to the duration of unemployment spells. The time to exit of unem-
ployment can be thought of as a random variable, T . This variable represents the duration
of stay in the state of unemployment. The probability distribution of the duration of un-
employment - the probability that the random variable T is less than some value t - can
be specified by the distribution function F (t) = Pr(T < t). Two other functions which are
particularly relevant in studying duration data are the Hazard and the Survivor functions.
The survivor function, S(t), represents the probability of remaining in a specific state, i.e.,
the probability that the random variable T will equal or exceed the value t. It can be defined
as S(t) = 1  F (t) = Pr(T  t). The hazard function, b(t), is the rate at which unem-
ployment spells will be completed at duration t, given that they last until t. It is defined as
16A similar picture is obtained by looking at unemployment durations. The most skilled occupations have
the lowest durations, while regional education by occupation is negatively correlated with unemployment
duration.
17Scotland, South East, metropolitan West Midlands and rest of the Northern region
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b(t) = f(t)/S(t). Both of these functions depend on a vector of explanatory variables x(t)
and some unknown coe!cients q and b0.
We consider a proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)). This model separates the hazard
function, into two parts. The first part, b0(t), is called the ”baseline” hazard and repre-
sents a functional form for the dependence of the hazard on duration t. The second part,
[.], describes the way in which the hazard shifts between individuals endowed with dif-
ferent x(t) at a given duration t. The eect of explanatory variables is to multiply the
hazard b0 by a factor  which does not depend on duration t. A convenient specification
is [x(t), q] = exp[x(t)q] since it ensures the non-negativity of b[.] without constraining
the parameter space for q. In addition, with this specification we can interpret the coef-
ficient q as the proportional eect of x(t) on the conditional probability of completing a spell.
In our dataset we only observe the transitions out of unemployment on a monthly basis, so
we have to use a discrete-time hazard function, hi(t). This function denotes the conditional
probability that an unemployment spell lasts until time t+1, given that it has lasted until t.
We will use a complementary log-log specification, which has been shown to be the discrete-
time counterpart of an underlying continuous-time proportional hazard model (Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978)).
hi(t) = Pr[Ti = t+ 1 | Ti  t, xi(t)] (13)
= 1 exp


] t+1
t
bi(s)ds

= 1 exp

 exp[xi(t)q] ·
] t+1
t
b0(s)ds

given that xi(t) is constant between t and t+ 1. Equation (13) can be rewritten as
hi(t) = 1 exp { exp[xi(t)q + (t)]} (14)
where
(t) =
] t+1
t
b0(s)ds
is called the integrated ”baseline” hazard.
Initially, we will not assume a specific functional form for (t) and estimate the model
semiparametrically. Then, we check the robustness of our results, by estimating the model
parametrically assuming (t) takes a Weibull form (see Kiefer (1988)) like (t) = k0tk1 .
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The contribution to the log-likelihood of the ith individual with a spell of length ti is given
by
lnLi = ci ln f(ti) + (1 ci) lnS(ti)
where right-censored observations, ci = 0, contribute to the likelihood only with the survivor
function since in that case all we know is that the spell of unemployment has lasted until
moment ti. Substituting the definition of the discrete-time hazard function (equation 14)
and the survivor function, we get the likelihood function that will be estimated
lnLi = ci {ln [1 exp { exp[xi(ti)q + (ti)]}] exp[xi(ti)q + (ti)]}

ti[
t=1
exp[xi(t)
q + (t)] (15)
So far, we have wrongly considered that there is only one possible transition out of unem-
ployment. An unemployment spell can terminate when the individual finds a job, but also
when he gives up searching and becomes inactive. Given that we are interested in the first
type of transition, we need to estimate a competing risk model of duration that distinguishes
exit into employment from exit into inactivity. Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) show
that the parameters of the hazard into employment can be estimated by treating durations
finishing for other reasons as censored at the time of exit. Having done this, the proportional
hazard specification used for the single-risk model can be applied to the job-finding hazard.
Using this methodology one can also control for unobserved heterogeneity by conditioning
the hazard rate on an individual’s unobserved characteristics, summarized in the variable
v (Lancaster (1990), chapter 4). This is a random variable taking on positive values, with
the mean normalized to one (for identification reasons) and finite variance j2. Then, the
conditional hazard function (in continuous time) can be re-written as:
b[t, x(t),q,b0] = b0(t) exp[x(t)q + vi]
with vi independent of xi and t. Since each individual vi is unobserved, we have to specify a
distribution for v, so that we can write the unconditional hazard and the survivor function
in terms of parameters that can be estimated and of the observable regressors included.
This is known as "integrating out" the unobserved eect. In the case of the discrete time
proportional hazard model, the Gamma distribution has been the most popular choice in
the empirical literature. This takes the form f(v) 2 vj3231 exp(j32v). The resulting pro-
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portional hazard specification identifies three sources of variation among individual hazard
rates: the duration of unemployment (t), the observable dierences among individuals (x(t))
and the unobservable ones (v). In a competing risk framework like this one, we also have
to impose the independence of these disturbance terms across the cause specific hazards.
Under these assumptions, the log likelihood described in equation 15 becomes the following:
lnLi = ln[(1 + j2
ti31[
t=1
exp {xiq + (t)})31/j
2
ci(1 + j2
ti[
t=1
exp {xiq + (t)})31/j
2
] (16)
Finally, since the variable of interest, the mean and variance of education, varies only across
time, regions and occupation groups, when calculating the standard errors we have to allow
for correlation of the errors between individuals belonging to the same cluster (see Moulton
(1986) for a detailed analysis of this problem for the OLS case).
5 Results
We are now in a position to study the eect of education externalities in the matching
process on the conditional probability of leaving unemployment. The theoretical model pre-
dicts that education matching externalities will aect positively the hazard of employment
of individuals belonging to skilled occupations and negatively the one of individuals from
unskilled occupations. The eect on individuals belonging to intermediate occupations will
have an indeterminate sign. The results of the estimation are reported in table 2. Each of
the specifications is estimated first including all individuals in the sample and then splitting
the sample into skilled and unskilled occupations. Finally, in table 3 the sample is divided
into 4 groups: high skilled, high semi-skilled, low semi-skilled and low skilled occupations.
The estimated coe!cients of the average education and the variance of education have the
signs predicted by the theoretical model, confirming the existence of a positive and significant
eect of education externalities in the matching process of the skilled segments of the UK
local labour markets and a negative and significant eect in the one of the unskilled segments
(table 2).
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Table 2: Semiparametric estimates by 2 o ccupations
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Baseline estimation (using levels of education)
Average education 0.705 3.375WWW 3.342WW 0.682 2.890W 3.386WW
var. of education 0.409W 1.306WW 1.044W 0.297 1.024 1.456WW
Using Years of education
Ave. years of edu. 0.420 2.514WWW 1.467W 0.314 2.168WW 1.199W
var. years of edu. 0.437 2.184WWW 0.914 0.279 1.948WW 0.812WW
Using Shares of Education (4 levels)
Share degree 0.004 0.483 0.060 0.026 0.280 0.057
Share A Level 0.096 0.132 0.197 0.076 0.099 0.193
Share O Level 0.399WW 0.414W 1.193WWW 0.372WW 0.529 1.189WW
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
Tabl e 3 : S emip ar amet ri c e s timat es by 4 o c cup at ion s
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables High H-Semi L-Semi Low High H-Semi L-Semi Low
Baseline estimation (using levels of education)
Ave edu 5.321W 2.560 2.449W 3.377WW 5.142W 2.544 1.746 3.658WW
Var edu 1.385 0.478 1.473W 1.062WW 0.438 0.366 1.314W 1.183WW
Using number of years of education
Ave edu 2.663W 2.116W 1.713WW 0.968 2.582W 2.048W 1.398W 0.864
Var edu 3.135 1.695 1.605WW 0.651 1.347 1.538 1.343WW 0.604
Using shares of education (4 levels)
Degree 3.003WW 0.255 0.238 0.003 2.265W 0.095 0.197 0.009
A Level 0.569 0.209 0.580WW 0.091 0.136 0.304 0.480WW 0.123
O Level 0.349 0.388 0.915 1.061WW 0.306 0.275 0.841 1.238WW
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
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We estimate first the model using the education variables measured in levels (first row of
table 2). When we estimate the model for all the occupations together (column 1) we obtain
a positive coe!cient for the average education and a negative coe!cient for the variance of
education, but both of them are not significant at the 10% significance level. However, when
we estimate instead the model separately for skilled (column 2) and unskilled occupations
(column 3)18 we realize that this aggregate result is the consequence of two eects of opposed
sign, as predicted by the theoretical model. The estimated coe!cient for the average edu-
cation is positive and significant at the 1% level of significance for the skilled occupations,
while it is negative and significant at the 5% level for the unskilled occupations. We find
a similar picture but with opposite signs for the variance of education. These results are
confirmed when we disaggregate further the occupations and estimate the model separately
by four occupational groups. The average level of education has the largest positive eect
on the hazard rate of the most skilled occupations (managerial & professional occupations),
with a level of significance of 10%. This eect is still positive but of smaller size and not
significant at the 10% level for the ”high semi-skilled” occupations. While it becomes nega-
tive and significant, for the ”low semi-skilled occupations”. Finally, it is more negative and
significant at the 5% level for the ”unskilled” occupations.
Re-estimating the model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity shows that although het-
erogeneity is important, the results are qualitatively unchanged (see right hand side panel of
table 2). The likelihood ratio test indicates that we cannot reject the model with unobserved
heterogeneity and the estimated gamma variance is significantly dierent from zero (see last
part of table 14 in appendix D). The average level of education and the variance of education
still have a significant eect when we run the estimations separately for high skilled and low
skilled occupations, although of smaller magnitude - a coe!cient of 2.9 and -3.4 instead of
3.4 and -3.3 for high and low skilled occupations, respectively. The same is true for the more
dissaggregated estimations (see RHS of table 3). This indicates that part of the eect orig-
inally attributed to the education externality is actually due to unobserved characteristics.
However, the fact that the eect is still statistically significant confirms the predictions of
the theoretical model and the existence of education externalities in the matching process
taking place in the UK local labour markets.
These results are robust to dierent to dierent measures of the distribution of education
and to dierent parameterizations of the hazard function. Firstly, we re-estimate the model
18Skilled occupations correspond to occupations 5-9 of the SOC classification, while unskilled occupations
correspond to occupations 1-4.
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using two alternative measures of the distribution of education: the average and the variance
of the number of years in post-compulsory education19 and the share of the labour force by
four education levels. Table 2 (row 2) shows that using the number of years of education
provides qualitatively similar results to using an ordinal classification of education. The
main dierence being that the negative eect on less skilled occupations is less significant.
And in particular is insignificant for the least skilled group of the four occupations used.
This is due to the fact that this education variable gives a lower weight to the lower edu-
cation categories which are the predominant ones in the less skilled occupations. The third
row of table 2 shows that using the labour force shares by education level we also find a
qualitatively similar picture, specially when looking at the four occupations separately (ta-
ble 3). A larger proportion of people with degree increases the transitions into employment
of the most skilled occupations, while a larger share with A Level reduces the transitions
into employment of the semi-skilled occupations and a larger share with O Level reduces the
transitions of unskilled occupations. Secondly, re-estimating the model using a fully para-
metric approach assuming a Weibull hazard function (table 13) results in coe!cients for the
average education and the variance of education of similar sign and statistical significance,
but of marginally larger magnitude (in absolute terms). These results are also robust to
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (RHS of table 13).
Considering all these results together we can conclude that the eect of the distribution of
education on the transitions into employment takes a u-shaped form across occupations. The
re-employment probability is higher (lower) for individuals belonging to a skilled (unskilled)
segment of the local labour market where the average level of education is higher and where
the variance is lower. The reason for this dierential eect, as explained in the theoretical
section, is that an increase in the average education level of a labour market generates two
opposing forces aecting the matching process: a external or composition eect and a com-
petition eect. The composition eect appears because a more qualified workforce increases
expected profits by firms raising job creation and reducing unemployment duration. How-
ever, when average education is higher, the competition between unemployed individuals
for the available vacancies becomes more intense, increasing unemployment duration. In
the case of skilled jobs, where the worker’s qualifications are very important for firms, the
external eect dominates the competition eect. In the case of unskilled jobs, firms consider
education as a minimum requirement but not as a fundamental determinant of the expected
profits from the job. This means that job creation reacts less to a more qualified workforce
19Instead of using an ordinal classification of education like in the rest of the paper, we attribute the
number of years of post-compulsory education required to acquire that qualification - 0 years for other, 1
year for O Level, 3 years for A Level and 5 years for degree.
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Figure 8: Base line hazard by o c cupation group
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and the competition eect dominates the external eect.
Figure 7 shows the estimated baseline hazard of the representative individual20 for the es-
timation including all individuals from all occupations. The hazard of re-employment is
increasing for durations up to 4-5 months and then decreasing, with some small peaks,
which is consistent with the literature on unemployment duration (see Narendranathan and
Stewart (1993) and Boheim and Taylor (2000)). The estimated baseline hazard for skilled
and unskilled occupations shows a very similar picture (figure 8). The skilled occupations
have a higher hazard than the unskilled ones for all durations. That is, individuals from the
20The representative individual has the following characteristics: male, 25-49 years of age, white, married,
non-migrant, head of household, education of O Level or equivalent, personal or clerical occupation and
living in the region with the median national average level of education (non-metropolitan areas of the West
midlands region). We use the average value for all the other variables.
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duration in months
duration in months
skilled occupations have a higher probability of leaving unemployment independently of how
long they have been unemployed for.
In order to have an idea of the magnitude of this eect on the probability of re-employment
we look at the shift in the estimated baseline hazard of a representative person after a change
in the average level of education. A 1% rise in average education shifts the hazard upwards of
the representative skilled individual by 2.9% on average, while a 1% decrease in the variance
of education shifts the hazard upwards by 0.2% on average (table 4). The opposite pattern
is obtained for the representative unskilled individual, - 1.9% and -0.2% for a 1% change
in the variables. These numbers are comparable to those obtained by other studies in the
literature. Moretti (1999) finds that a 1% rise in the share of college graduates increases
wages of graduates by 1.2%, while Rauch (1993) finds that a one-year increase in average
schooling raises individual wages between 3 and 5%.
Table 4: Average % change in baseline hazard
Skilled Unskilled
All Occup. Occup.
1% % average education 0.40 2.88 -1.92
1% & variance of education 0.03 0.24 -0.19
average region to Scotland 2.59 12.02 -5.27
average region to West Mid (met) -3.40 -34.84 31.84
One can also use this method to have an idea of the magnitude of the eect of regional dier-
ences in the distribution of education. A representative individual of the skilled occupations
would experience an increase in the probability of finding a job of 12% if the regional level of
education increased from the national mean to the level of the top region (Scotland). That
same individual would experience a reduction in his probability of leaving unemployment of
35% if the level of education decreased from the mean to the level of the worst region (West
Midlands Met.). That is, regional dierences in education could imply a dierence in the
probability of leaving unemployment of up to 47%. This number goes down to 37% when
we consider the unskilled occupations.
The model has also been estimated separately by sex and occupational group and by age
group and occupational group (table 5).21
21The age groups are defined as follows: young = 16-34 & old = 35-59 if female and 35-64 if male. We run
31
Tab le 5 : M aximu m l ike lih o o d est imate s o f r e- employme nt
pr ob ab ili tie s by ge nd er an d ag e g ro up
Semiparametric Semiparametric
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Male
Average education 0.787 3.289 5.626WWW 1.097 1.938 5.167WW
var. of education 0.251 1.783 2.050WWW 0.181 1.653 2.123WWW
Female
Average education 0.698 3.542WW 0.794 0.352 1.388WW 0.277
var. of education 0.486W 1.141W 0.257 0.321 0.443 0.325
Young (16 34)
Average education 0.623 6.079WWW 5.105WWW 0.410 1.982WWW 2.184WW
var. of education 0.211 2.114WWW 1.721WWW 0.165 1.139W 1.826WW
Old (35 59/65)
Average education 1.025 0.928 0.613 0.560 0.736 0.048
var. of education 0.755WW 0.653 0.332 0.509W 0.193 0.266
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
The eect of the education externality in the matching process shows a similar pattern to
the estimation for all the individuals, with a stronger positive eect for the most skilled
occupations and a stronger negative eect for the least skilled occupations. However, the
magnitude of the eect and the levels of significance are dierent across gender and age
group. By age group, the eect is larger in magnitude and statistically more significant
for younger workers independently of the level of aggregation of the occupations, while it
is always insignificant for older workers. By gender, the average level of education has a
stronger and more significant negative eect on the transitions into employment of male
workers from unskilled occupations, while it has a stronger and more significant positive
eect on the transitions into employment of female workers from skilled occupations.
Finally, we need to evaluate the relative importance of matching education externalities with
these estimations separately, not because we believe the externality should aect these groups dierently,
but because for other reasons, like female participation or youngsters’ lack of job experience, these might be
completely dierent labour markets.
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respect to skill-biased technological externalities. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical model
does not provide a way of distinguishing between these two types of externalities. In this
study we have tried to do this by including variables in the estimation which act as a proxy
for the technological level of the occupation. These variables are the share of employment
of each industry in each occupation and region over time.22. In the first row of table 7 we
have the results of estimating the standard econometric model excluding the variables mea-
suring the technology in the occupation23. These estimation results are very similar to those
of the standard estimation (including the regional technological level) although moderately
lower. This suggests that technological externalities do not reduce the probability of leaving
unemployment. Therefore, if one accepts this way of controlling for technology as correct,
one should conclude that the most relevant type of externality in the matching process are
the pecuniary externalities.
5.1 Regional labour market variables and individual controls
The eect of regional labour market variables on unemployment duration in the standard
model estimated are shown in table 6. Firstly, the estimated coe!cient of the regional un-
employment rate has a negative sign and is significant for all the specifications, while the
one for the inactivity rate has a positive sign and is significant for the skilled occupations
(and for all the occupations together). The reason for this is that the bigger the number
of people unemployed and/or active the greater the number of people looking for work and
therefore the lower the market tightness, which reduces the probability of finding a job. This
is an standard theoretical result of matching models (see Pissarides (2000) and Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the literature) and is in accordance with the model
developed in this paper. However, it is more di!cult to explain why does a higher inactiv-
ity rate benefit only the skilled individuals. Anyway, this eect becomes insignificant when
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Secondly, The vacancy rate has a positive sign, as expected from the theoretical model (see
also Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). The larger the number of vacancies opened, the
easier it is for unemployed individuals to find a job and therefore the shorter the average
unemployment spell. However, it is not significant at the 10% level. This is most probably
22They are calculated using 4 industries, 4 occupations and 19 regions.
23We have included instead variables measuring the regional technological level, i.e., the employment
share of each industry in each region. The idea being that we still want to avoid the bias coming from
technological externalities which are neutral across skills. But excluding these aswell does not change the
results qualitatively
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due to the fact that vacancies registered at job centers are known to under-represent the
total number of vacancies.24
Table 6: Regional variables in standard estimati on using all
in divi dua ls i n t he s ampl e ( Tab le 2)
Semiparametric Semiparametric
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Regional labour market variables
Unemp rate 0.630WWW 0.687WWW 0.841WWW 0.646WWW 0.880WWW 1.033WWW
Vacancy rate 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.054 0.096 0.057
Inactivity rate 0.561 1.283W 0.205 0.188WW 1.088 0.375
Regional migration
Migration ratio 0.080WW 0.087W 0.080WW 0.035 0.111 0.075
Finally, the estimated coe!cients of the individual and household variables have in general
the expected signs, which are consistent with the existing literature. For the baseline model
these are shown in table 14 in appendix D.
5.2 Robustness of Results
In this section we have tried to take into account some of the standard econometric prob-
lems one may encounter when estimating external eects. In particular, we have worried
about the endogeneity of independent variables and an omitted variable bias (see Brock and
Durlauf (2000) and Dietz (2001) for two excellent surveys on this issue).25
24Alternatively, if the education externality works through vacancy creation, the vacancy rate might not
have a significant eect because it is already proxied by the average level of education. However, this seems
unlikely, since dropping the regional average and variance of education from the estimation increases the
significance of this variable only marginally.
25Another related problem when estimating external eects is that of identification or reflection problem
(Manski (1993)). This problem arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a popu-
lation tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals
that comprise the group. However, Manski (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2000) proved that identification is
eased in non-linear models and in particular in duration models. In addition, they showed that this problem
is further eased if there is within-group heterogeneity. Since our study fulfills both of these properties we
understand that identification of the external eects should not be a problem here.
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Table 7: Robustness of results by two o cc upati on groups us-
in g a ll ind ivid ua ls in th e sa mple
Semiparametric Semiparametric
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Dropping industrial share
Average education 0.951 2.616WW 3.139WW 0.804 2.193WW 3.324WW
var. of education 0.489WW 1.577WWW 0.910W 0.466WW 1.255WWW 1.270WW
Dropping top (Scot, SE) & bottom (WMid (met), RestN) regions in education
Average education 2.468WW 5.058WWW 1.527 2.083WW 4.272WW 1.203
var. of education 0.747WW 1.303W 0.628 0.614W 1.062W 0.590
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
The endogeneity of independent variables is a common problem to all studies of external and
neighbourhood eects. If location and occupational group were predetermined and fixed for
all individuals there would not be a problem. However, we know that individuals are able
to choose to a certain extent the area and group they belong to. In addition, we know that
firms are also able to choose the area where they search for workers and the definition of
occupational groups. This could generate a sorting process by which individuals with similar
characteristics live together and belong to similar occupational groups. This would then be
problematic for the estimation of the external eects because the characteristics determining
the group of interest are the same as those determining the problem we are studying, there-
fore generating biased and inconsistent estimators (Greene (1993)).The question is whether
the group characteristics used to measure these eects are exogenous variables or not with
respect to the formation of the group. Therefore, the empirical definition of the market seg-
ment is very important. As explained in section 3, we have assumed the market segment is
the occupation (using 4 occupational groups) within each region. One can think of two main
problems with this definition. The first problem is that given the focus of this work is on
education externalities, one would want to have segments whose boundaries do not change
with the rise in education. But we know that in reality in parallel to the rise in education
attainment there has been an increase in the education requirements of vacant jobs and
therefore the boundaries of the occupational groups have moved upwards in the education
scale. As a consequence, even if the working population had not increased their education
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level, we would observe a rise in the average education level of all the occupations.26 This
phenomenon has been named the problem of overeducation or degree’s inflation, implying
that education attainment is used as a signaling device. However, this issue will not bias the
empirical results of this paper. To do so, it would require that the change in the boundaries
of the occupational groups generates both, a rise in the average education of the segment
and in the transition rates into employment of its members, for a given number of vacancies
(otherwise it would be due to education externalities). While the former is always true, the
latter is not. By definition, if the rise in the average education of each occupational group is
only due to signalling reasons, it will not increase workers’ productivity and, therefore, it will
not increase the transition rates into employment. The second problem with the definition
of labour market segment used is how to classify workers who do not report an occupation,
either because they have never worked before or because they have been unemployed or
inactive for a long period of time. In this work we have chosen to include these workers in
the least skilled occupation. This is not very problematic for the case of previously inactive
or long-term unemployed workers, since it is consistent with assuming that skills depreciate
very quickly when out of work, a common assumption in the literature. However, it might
be more problematic for the case of new market entrants. In this case, the estimated eect
of education externalities could be biased downwards, since one would expect these workers
to be very qualified and therefore improve the average level of education of the least skilled
occupation, instead of the one of the occupation to which they should have been allocated.
The omitted variable bias is another potential problem. If there are omitted variables cor-
related with both the dependent variable and the regressors measuring the distribution of
education, the estimated coe!cients could be biased and wrongly significant.
Most studies in this literature solve both of these problems by instrumenting for the variables
measuring the distribution of education. The problem is that instrumental variables is not
a technique that can be used with duration models.27 Therefore, the relevant question that
needs to be answered here is how important is the endogeneity due to the sorting process
and omitted variables bias in this particular study.
26This would be true even for the least skilled occupational group since its upper boundary would have
risen aswell and it would englobe now some workers with higher education than before.
27But even if we could, we would require a variable that is correlated with the distribution of education
but is not correlated with the sorting process or any omitted variable and varies both across occupation
groups within regions and over time and such instrument is not available. Previous studies in this literature
which used instruments where cross-sectional and focused on education externalities by geographical area,
not by occupational group. This allowed them to use instruments which vary across areas but not across
time, like the demographic structure a decade before (Moretti (1999) & Ciccone and Peri (2000))
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Ta ble 8 : Per ce ntag e of the Var i a tio n of t he e du cat ion va ri ab l e
explained by region, o ccupation and time
First of all, one would like to know what are the sources of exogenous variation in average
education between segments, and of individual education within segments. Both types of ex-
ogenous variation are needed to be able to distinguish eects due to dierences in aggregates
from eects due to dierences in individual endowments. As table 8 shows there is exoge-
nous variation in average education between segments, the largest source of this variation
coming from dierences across occupational groups (82% for skilled and 66% for unskilled
occupations), although dierences over time and across regions are also important (16% for
skilled and 31% for unskilled occupations). When looking at each occupation separately, it
is regional dierences that account for most of the variation in the education of the segment
- between 44% and 75%. The existence of exogenous variation of individual education within
segments is clear from the significance of the individual education dummies in table 14 in
the appendix.
There are some reasons why the sorting process might not have an important eect on the
estimation of external eects in this study. First of all, the areas used in this study - 4
occupations group within each of 19 regions - are very large and heterogeneous. Although
migration of skilled workers will generate a higher concentration of qualified individuals in
the most skilled occupations of the best regions, there will still be a large number of workers
from all types in each region (eg. because of house ownership or housing benefit) and a per-
fect sorting process would be impossible. Secondly, even if the sorting process is important,
there is no reason to believe that it has has been increasing during the sample period. Thus,
it would mainly be a level eect which should be captured by the region, occupation and
time dummies.
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2 occupational groups 4 occupational groups
Skilled Unskilled High Semi-high Semi-low low
time 6.9 12.4 37.6 18.9 30.7 30.6
region 9.5 18.1 44.4 74.9 57.1 58.9
occupation 81.6 65.5    
region*time 0.1 0.6 18.0 6.2 12.2 10.5
region*occupation 2.0 1.5    
occupation*time 0.0 0.0    
region*occupation*time 0.1 1.9    
Nevertheless, we have undertaken some simple tests to check the potential importance of en-
dogeneity. One would expect the eects of the sorting process to be stronger in the areas at
the extremes of the distribution. However, when we run the regression excluding the regions
that consistently have had the highest or lowest education level for the whole sample 28 we
find that the eect of the externality remains very significant and, if anything, is stronger (see
second row of table 7), but insignificant for unskilled occupations. Alternatively, one could
try to understand the mechanism behind the sorting process. Regional migration would be
one of the most important sorting mechanisms. If a large proportion of skilled workers move
to the areas with highest wages and lowest unemployment rates, the average education of
the workforce there will improve. At the same time, a high immigration rate will increase
the demand for housing and raise the costs of living of the recipient area. This might push
the least skilled individuals out of these areas, since they cannot aord to live there. Both
of these forces increase the average education in the area. In order to take into account
this particular sorting mechanism we have controlled in the estimation for people who have
migrated into the region during the previous year but also for the aggregate migration flows
in the region (number of immigrants over number of emigrants)29. Being a migrant has a
positive but insignificant eect on the hazard of employment. This is due to the fact that
the LFS underestimates the number of migrants because is a survey of non-movers. In terms
of the migration flows into the region, the estimated coe!cient is positive and significant,
but it becomes insignificant when we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Overall, we be-
lieve these results indicate that, although there might be some endogeneity in the dependent
variable, it is not having an important eect on the estimated coe!cients.
It is not so easy to find simple tests to check the importance of a possible omitted vari-
able bias. However, the fact that we include many individual, family and area variables
in the estimation should reduce the importance of this eect. Moreover, in order to bias
the coe!cient measuring the external eect, the omitted variables have to vary both across
groups and over time since the region, occupation and time dummies included in the esti-
mation are already capturing any possible eect constant across groups or over time. One
way of controlling for omitted variables in the estimation of a duration model is controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity. However, this technique only controls for omitted variables
which are uncorrelated with both the covariates and time. Nevertheless, one could use it
28Scotland, the South East, Metropolitan West Midlands and the Rest of the Northern region
29It would be preferable to have the migration ratio by occupational group in each region, but this data
is only available from the Labour Force Survey and the sample size is too small to draw any significant
conclusions.
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as an indicator of the importance of this problem. As was mentioned above, controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity (RHS of table 2) does not make the external eect disappear,
although it reduces its magnitude. Therefore, even though it seems that this problem is not
very important in this study, one should be aware that it could be biasing slightly the results.
6 Vacancy Creation and Education Externalities.
The theoretical model developed in this paper showed that a higher level of education im-
proves the expected profits per vacancy opened, which in turn increases job creation and
market tightness (see equation (9)), improving the probability of employment for a given
aggregate supply of search units. That is, the positive external eect of education (or com-
position eect) in the matching process is generated through higher vacancy creation. So far,
we have shown that education externalities raise the probability of finding a job for skilled
occupations and lower it for unskilled occupations, but we have not analyzed the mechanism
through which this eect is working. In this section we will try to do so, by using a quarterly
panel on vacancies notified to UK job centers by occupational group (using the SOC 91
classification) and 19 regions for the period 1992-99. This data is obtained from job centers
and is provided by NOMIS. We are conscious that the number of vacancies posted at job
centers could be significantly lower than the real number of vacancies, especially for the most
skilled occupations. This means that any result from this analysis should be considered as
a lower bound of the total real eect of education externalities on vacancy creation. The
covariates are obtained from the spring quarter of the non-longitudinal LFS.
We estimate a fixed eects panel using the log of market tightness in the local labour market
as the dependent variable. This is defined as the number of vacancies notified divided by the
number of unemployed by quarter, 9 occupational groups and 19 regions. The covariates are
the average education and variance of education of the occupation group within each region
and quarter, the unemployment, inactivity rates and the annual immigration and emigration
rates by region. The fixed eects used in the estimation are occupation, region and quarter.
The estimation results confirm that in the UK local labour markets during the 1990s (table
9) the eect of education externalities on the matching process is working through higher
job creation as indicated by the theoretical model. The eect has a similar pattern to the
one on the duration of unemployment. An increase in the average education of the local
labour market raises market tightness, while an increase in the variance reduces it. This
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eect is strongest for the skilled occupations. However, in this model the average education
also has a positive eect on the market tightness of the unskilled occupations but of smaller
magnitude and less significant, while the variance has a negative eect. The results still hold
when we instrument using four lags of the education variables.
Ta bl e 9 : F ixed Eec ts panel estimation o f the Va cancy rate
Variables Fixed Eects I.V. Fixed Eects
all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Regional Education Externalities
Av. education 0.895WWW 1.374WWW 0.682WWW 1.903WWW 2.831WWW 1.596WWW
s.d. education 0.313WWW 0.190WWW 0.180WWW 0.483WWW 0.318WWW 0.286WWW
Regional Labour Markets
Unemp rt 1.004WWW 1.144WWW 0.818WWW 0.963WWW 1.100WWW 0.755WWW
Inactivity rt 1.880WWW 2.060WWW 1.683WWW 1.856WWW 2.078WWW 1.527WWW
Regional Migration by occupation
Immigration rt 0.041WWW 0.045WWW 0.031WWW 0.042WWW 0.042WWW 0.035WWW
Emigration rt 0.027WWW 0.033 0.016WWW 0.018WW 0.023 0.005WW
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
7 Conclusions
This study examines the eect of education externalities on the matching process taking
place in UK local labour markets. First of all, we have shown theoretically that a higher
level of education of the workers participating in the labour market raises the expected profits
of opened vacancies, since firms expect to be matched with a more qualified worker. This in-
creases job creation and reduces the unemployment rate. This is the external or composition
eect. At the same time, a more educated labor force is also be more e!cient searching for
jobs. This will increase the competition amongst workers for opened vacancies and increase
the unemployment rate. The net eect on unemployment depends on the relative importance
of these two eects. We hypothesize that for the case of individuals from skilled segments
of the labour market the external eect would dominate the competition eect. The reason
being that is precisely in these markets where the worker’s qualifications are a fundamental
determinant of the firm’s profits, while in the least skilled segments of the labour market are
considered less important. Then, we tested this result empirically by estimating the eect
of the education distribution in a labour market (measured by the average and variance of
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education) on the probability of transition from unemployment to employment.
We find that, for individuals belonging to skilled occupational groups (managers/professionals
and technical occupations), a higher average level of education increases the probability of
transition from unemployment to employment, while a higher variance, or a more unequal
distribution, reduces it. However, the opposite is true for individuals belonging to less skilled
occupational groups (clerical, service and manual). The reason behind this is that in the
latter case the increase in the competition for vacancies among unemployed workers due to
the higher level of education more than osets the eect of the education externality.
The eect of the education externality on the hazard into employment is not only statistically
significant but also relevant in magnitude. A rise of 1% in the average level of education
shifts up the baseline hazard of the representative individual by 2.9% on average for the
more skilled occupations, while it shifts it downwards by -1.9% for the less skilled occupa-
tional groups. Regional dierences in the distribution of education also have a very large
eect shifting the baseline hazard by around 47% for skilled occupations and by 37% for the
nskilled occupations.
The estimated baseline hazard of the representative individual is increasing for durations up
to 5 months and then decreasing, with some small peaks. This is true for all individuals and
by occupational group. However, skilled occupational groups have a higher baseline hazard
for all durations, indicating that they have a higher probability of leaving unemployment
independently of how long they have been unemployed for.
Then, we confirme that the positive external eect of education (or composition eect) in
the matching process is generated through higher vacancy creation by estimating the eect
of the distribution of education on a fixed eects panel of the vacancy rate. We find that the
average level of education increases the vacancy creation of skilled occupations, while the
variance of education reduces it. However, we do not find the opposite eect for unskilled
occupations.
Finally, the estimated results are very robust. They are qualitatively unchanged when we
estimate the model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, using dierent measures of
education and using dierent parameterizations of the hazard function. In addition, the
results are also robust to the standard econometric problems considered in the literature.
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A Appendix: Definition of Education Variable.
Table 10: Education Variabl e
Education level Composition
Degree or more Higher degree, First degree or other degree, teaching (all levels)
High Vocational Nursing, NVQ levels 3-5, HNC, HND, BTEC higher, RSA
higher diploma, other higher education qualifications below de-
gree
A Level or equivalent A Level, Scottish 6th year Certificate, AS Level, SCE higher
Middle Vocational NVQ level 3, GNVQ advanced, RSA advanced diploma, ONC,
OND, BTEC and SCOTVEC national.
O Level or equivalent O Level, GCSE grade A-C
Low Vocational NVQ level 2, GNVQ intermediate, RSA diploma, City & Guilds
advanced & craft, BTEC/SCOTVEC general diploma and
completed apprenticeship
Other academic CSE below grade 1, GCSE below grade C
Other vocational NVQ level 1, GNVQ/GSVQ foundation level,
BTEC/SCOTVEC general certificate, SCOTVEC mod-
ules, RSA other, City & Guild other, YT/YTP certificate,
other vocational/professional qualifications
No qualifications
B Appendix: Classification of regions.
Ta bl e 1 1: Cl as s i ficat i on o f re gio ns
Region Counties
Rest of Northern Region Cleveland, Cumbria, Durham, Northumberland
South Yorkshire South Yorkshire
West Yorkshire West Yorkshire
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside Humberside, North Yorkshire
East Midlands Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamp-
tonshire, Nottinghamshire
East Anglia Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suolk
Inner London Inner London
continued on next page
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Tab l e 11: continued
Outer London Outer London
Rest of South East Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, East sus-
sex, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Isle of wight,
Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, West sussex
South West Avon, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Som-
erset, Wiltshire
West Midlands Metropolitan West midlands Metropolitan
Rest of West Midlands Hereford & Worcester, Shropshire, Staordshire, war-
wickshire
Greater Manchester Greater Manchester
Merseyside Merseyside
Rest of North West Cheshire, Lancashire
Wales Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwent, Gwynedd, Mid Glamorgan,
Powys, South Glamorgan, West Glamorgan
Strathclyde Strathclyde
Rest of Scotland Borders, Central, Dumfries & galloway, Fife,
Grampian, Highland, Lothian, Northern & western
isles, Tayside
C Appendix: Definition of the variables used in the
estimation.
REGIONAL VARIABLES:
Average education: Average value of education variable (defined above) across all individuals
of working age by occupational group (4, as defined in table 1), region and quarter.
variance of education: Variance of education variable (defined above) across all individuals
of working age by occupational group (4), region and quarter.
Unemp rate: Unemployment rate across all active individuals by region and quarter.
Vacancy rate: Vacancy rate (number of vacancies notified to job centers / number of unem-
ployed) by occupational group (4, as defined in table 1), region and quarter.
Inactivity rate: Inactivity rate across all individuals of working age by region and quarter.
Migration ratio: Migration ratio (number of immigrants / number of emigrants) by region
and year.
43
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Sex : 1 male, 0 female.
Age: 16-24, 25-34, 35-49 years of age: 1 age group, 0 otherwise. (50-64 (59 female) reference
category.)
Ethnic origin: 1 white, 0 otherwise.
Married : 1 married, 0 otherwise.
Migrant : 1 if migrated from another region since last year, 0 otherwise.
Head of Household : 1 head of household, 0 otherwise.
Individual’s Education: Other Voc - Degree: 1 level of highest educational attainment, 0
otherwise.
Last Job’s Occupational Group: Operator - Manager: 1 occupational group in last job, 0
otherwise.
no dep child< 6: number of dependent children under the age of six living in the household.
no dep child< 16: number of dependent children under the age of sixteen living in the
household.
no working: number of members of the household working at the time of the interview.
one-person house: household made of one person only.
two-person house: household made of a couple.
Housing benet : receiving housing benefit during unemployment.
Unemp benet : receiving unemployment benefit during unemployment.
Family benet: receiving financial help from relatives during unemployment.
Tab l e 12 : S amp le me an s of i nd ivid ual cha ra ct er istic s by o c -
cupation group
Variables all occup skilled occup unskilled occup
Duration Characteristics
% exit into employment 40.8 45.0 37.1
% exit into inactivity 15.7 12.5 18.6
% stay unemployed 43.5 42.5 44.3
average duration 3.36 3.31 3.41
Individual Characteristics (%)
Male 56.1 62.7 50.4
16-24 years of age 35.0 26.2 42.6
25-34 years of age 24.5 25.6 23.5
35-49 years of age 27.7 31.9 24.0
continued on next page
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Tab l e 12: continued
50-59/64 years of age 12.8 16.3 9.9
Non-white 7.4 6.4 8.3
Married 45.0 51.7 39.0
Migrant 2.2 2.3 2.2
Head of Household 39.3 46.0 33.4
Individual’s Education (%)
Other Voc 9.1 8.0 10.1
Other Acad 7.8 5.8 9.6
Low Voc 16.9 22.1 12.4
O Level 18.9 17.1 20.4
Mid Voc 2.9 3.8 2.0
A Level 6.3 7.2 5.5
High Voc 4.1 6.2 2.3
Degree 6.7 11.9 2.2
Last Job’s Occupational Group (%)
Operator 14.2 0.0 26.6
Sales 11.5 0.0 21.6
Personal 11.4 0.0 21.5
Clerical 15.7 0.0 0.0
Craft 14.6 31.3 0.0
Technical 5.4 11.7 0.0
Professional 3.8 8.2 0.0
Manager 7.1 15.3 0.0
Household Structure
no dep child < 6 0.29 0.27 0.31
no dep child < 16 0.81 0.70 0.91
no working 1.2 1.2 1.2
% one person house 12.9 15.2 10.9
% two person house 23.7 26.0 21.6
Benefits (quarter before exit (%))
Housing benefit 7.3 5.7 8.7
Unemp benefit 52.8 59.9 46.6
Family credit 1.3 0.9 1.7
No of cases 15, 974 7, 459 8, 515
NOTES: "high occup" denotes occupations 5-9 of the SOC classification,
while "low occup" denotes occupations 1-4 (see table 1.
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Figure 9: Base line hazard by se x
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Figure 10: Baseline hazard by age group
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D Appendix: Additional tables & figures
Tabl e 13: Estimates by 2 o ccupation groups
Weibull Weibull
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Baseline estimation (using levels of education)
Average education 0.816 3.660WWW 3.513WW 0.724 2.871W 3.608W
var. of education 0.398W 1.214WW 1.247WW 0.304 1.043 1.613WWW
Using Years of education
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duration in months
duration in months
Ave. years of edu. 0.464 2.650WWW 1.557W 0.459 2.175WW 1.507W
var. years of edu. 0.438 2.151WWW 1.062WW 0.383 1.991WW 1.124WW
Using Shares of Education (4 levels)
Share degree 0.038 0.584 0.011 0.064 0.257 0.031
Share A Level 0.118 0.105 0.207 0.080 0.055 0.039
Share O Level 0.468WWW 0.478 1.301WWW 0.432WW 0.584 1.540WWW
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
Tab l e 1 4: In divid ua l Co ntr ols s ta nda r d estima tio n usin g al l
in divi dua ls in th e s a mp l e by two o c cu pa tio n gr oup s ( tab le 2)
Semiparametric Semiparametric
no unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Variables all skilled unskilled all skilled unskilled
Individual Characteristics
Sex 0.034 0.067 0.027 0.032 0.136W 0.002
16-24 years of age 0.116WW 0.170WW 0.081 0.464WWW 0.314WW 0.084
25-34 years of age 0.465WWW 0.454WWW 0.486WWW 0.380WWW 0.652WWW 0.516WWW
35-49 years of age 0.346WWW 0.393WWW 0.279WWW 0.340WWW 0.581WWW 0.374WWW
White 0.235WWW 0.322WWW 0.130 0.268WWW 0.176 0.158W
Married 0.168WWW 0.124WW 0.242WWW 0.183WWW 0.180W 0.198WWW
Migrant 0.057 0.029 0.088 0.022 0.119 0.058
Head of Household 0.147WWW 0.191WWW 0.097WW 0.070WW 0.362WWW 0.146WWW
Individual’s Education
Other Voc 0.145WWW 0.176WW 0.129WW 0.101WW 0.156 0.116W
Other Acad 0.019 0.067 0.050 0.036 0.101 0.016
Low Voc 0.139WWW 0.160WWW 0.141WW 0.196WWW 0.216WW 0.154WW
O Level 0.039 0.101 0.017 0.123WWW 0.035 0.061
Mid Voc 0.061 0.332WWW 0.253 0.308WWW 0.346WW 0.095
A Level 0.017 0.089 0.035WWW 0.137WW 0.218 0.061
High Voc 0.289WWW 0.413WWW 0.105WWW 0.351WWW 0.388WWW 0.186
Degree 0.176WWW 0.248WWW 0.103W 0.248WWW 0.195W 0.181W
Last Job’s Occupational Group
Operator 0.893WWW 1.292WWW 1.237WWW 1.149WWW
Sales 0.889WWW 1.313WWW 1.284WWW 1.158WWW
Personal 0.919WWW 1.353WWW 1.424WWW 1.588WWW
continued on next page
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Tab l e 14: continued
Clerical 0.776WWW 1.185WWW 1.519WWW
Craft 0.884WWW 0.350WW 1.450WWW
Technical 0.804WWW 0.071 1.190WWW 0.121W
Professional 0.714W 0.567WW 1.418WWW 0.868W
Manager 0.483 0.749WWW 1.149WWW 1.013WW
Household Structure
no dep child < 6 0.078WWW 0.337 0.087WW 0.173WWW 0.447WWW 0.057
no dep child < 16 0.312WWW 0.048WWW 0.294WWW 0.027 0.053WWW 0.363WWW
no working 1.070WWW 1.072WWW 1.088WWW 1.105WWW 1.256WWW 1.353WWW
one person house 1.765WWW 1.772WWW 1.748WWW 0.204WWW 1.611WWW 2.080WWW
two person house 1.089WWW 1.055WWW 1.136WWW 0.086WW 0.749WWW 1.313WWW
Benefits
Housing benefit 0.305WWW 0.325WWW 0.265WW 0.614WWW 0.270 0.325WWW
Unemp benefit 0.129 0.149WWW 0.084W 0.190 0.123WW 0.147WWW
Family credit 0.313WWW 0.119 0.389WWW 0.217W 0.210 0.462WWW
Log Likelihood 16079 8139 7868 18571 8264 8032
Gamma Variance 0.439 0.532 0.450
Likelihood ratio st. 224.9 63.4 109.0
No cases 15974 7459 8515 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period.
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